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This paper present a thorough reflection on Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
programs, which may be viewed as the most innovative tools of the ‘environmental policy 
toolkit’. These are incentive-based mechanisms, compensating landowners to manage the 
natural resources under their control in a sustainable way (generating environmental 
services such as biodiversity protection and ecotourism), instead of clearing land or 
excessively exploiting their natural resources. After briefly discussing the most 
significant findings in the environment and development research stream, we will present 
how the roots of PES lie in public economic theory, with regard in particular to 
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this paper has been presented at ISEG – University of Lisbon (Portugal) during the 
workshop “Sustentabilidade, Terceiro Setor e Redes Sociais em Debate 1” in February 2016. 
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environmental externalities. Later, after debating the proper definition of PES and its 
main concepts (e.g. additionality, perverse incentives, conditionality), we shall also 
comment the main case-studies on the topic, in order to provide clear examples of how 
these instruments may be applied in several different context (i.e. both in developing and 
developed countries, either by public or private agents). As it shall be shown, given their 
high adaptability to local conditions, PES are likely to become extremely important in 
next decades’ environment safeguard interventions. 
Keywords Externalities, environmental taxes and subsidies (H 23), Forestry (Q 23), 
Sustainability, environment and development (Q 56), Relation of economics to other 




O texto contém uma reflexão sobre os Pagamentos por Serviços Ambientais (PSA), que 
podem ser considerados os instrumentos mais inovadores no âmbito das políticas 
ambientais. Estas compensações consistem na transferência de recursos (monetários ou 
outros) a quem ajuda a manter ou a produzir os serviços ambientais (por exemplo, 
proteção da biodiversidade e ecoturismo) numa maneira sustentável. Os mais importantes 
progressos na área de investigação sobre o ambiente e o desenvolvimento sustentável são 
discutidos em breve. Depois, com uma atenção particular às ligações com as teorias de 
economia pública, o presente artigo pretende analisar de que forma os programas PSA 
relacionam-se com os estudos sobre as externalidades ambientais. Ademais, as 
características principais dos PSA são descritas atentamente; são fornecidos também 
como exemplos explicativos os casos de maior sucesso, ilustrando como PSA podem ser 
estabelecidos em contextos muito diferentes (em países desenvolvidos e em 
desenvolvimento, por agentes públicos e privados). Enfim, será demonstrado como, 
apesar das suas complexidades e das longas investigações necessárias, os PSA podem 
tornar-se fundamentais pela proteção do meio-ambiente nos próximos anos. 
Palavras-chave Externalidades e políticas ambientais; Economia florestal; 
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Usually, the most studied economic models analyze how different variables (e.g. 
consumption, investments, public expenditure, etc.) contribute to economic growth, 
without considering how those variables affect natural resources and, more in general, 
life on Earth. Indeed, only few researches in development and ecological economics seem 
to pay enough attention to how growth itself and environment are interrelated (Farley and 
Daly, 2003). It turns out to be a remarkable shortage, unfortunately. In fact, if we consider 
the most important indicators over environmental degradation, a worrisome scenario is 
depicted. As a consequence, given the increasing relevance of the issue, in next decades 
scholars are expected to research new programs and tools to safeguard Earth’s ‘natural 
capital’. 
As a contribution to researches in the environment and development field, the 
purpose of this paper is to present and discuss what may be perhaps considered the most 
innovative tools for environmental protection, i.e. Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES). In short, these are compensations made to the manager of an Ecosystem Service 
(ES) to persuade him not to excessively exploit nor polluting the natural resources under 
his control (Engel et al., 2008). Given their heterogeneity, PES represent important tools, 
but on the other side, since these programs are usually established according to place-
based conditions, summarizing PES main features uniformly is not an easy task (Wunder 
et al., 2008). Nevertheless, general reports and guidelines have been already prepared by 
renowned agencies and researchers to offer a concrete overview of the topic (Smith et al., 
2013); our paper includes several referrals to those publications, as well as new 
considerations and analyses. What is important to be mentioned since the very beginning 
of our study is that PES do not represent an ‘universal panacea’, the ultimate solution to 
all environmental problems, since they should be carefully integrated in a policy mix 
including public sector interventions such as regulation and taxation. However, note that 
PES schemes are originally set up to protect and improve the provision of one, or more, 
ES; as a consequence, other socio-economic considerations, albeit linked to 
compensations and local communities involvements, should have a secondary role. 
Therefore, for the sake of completeness, and to offer possible hints for future 
policymaking, we find it relevant presenting the most exemplary PES programs around 
the world, showing how effectively these may be adapted to very different contexts 
(Smith et al., 2013 b). In particular, the last part of this work shall discuss projects and 
initiatives with very peculiar features, since some of them take place in developed (e.g. 
France) and developing (e.g. Bolivia) countries and are run either by public (e.g. Costa 
Rica) or private economic agents. We shall also present the main features of a recent 
project (named Arbio) in Peruvian rainforest, that aims at creating a model to lower 
deforestation in the Amazon region and to promote instead its sustainable conservation 
in an innovative way (Recanati et al., 2015).  
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The paper is then structured as follows. Section 2 offers a general theoretical 
background on the environment-development relationship. Section 3 introduces the 
concept of ‘ecosystem services’ and briefly discusses the main tools for environmental 
safeguard. Section 4 presents PES from a general perspective, debating also its formal 
definition. Section 5 describes explanatory examples of PES in different part of the world. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
The concept of sustainable development has been largely argued, promoted and 
criticized overtime by economists, sociologists and scientists: nonetheless, given its 
multifaceted nature, it is still controversial, and policies aimed at enhancing it, as the 
debates of the Conference of the Parties held in Paris in December 2015 have 
demonstrated2, result hard to be agreed upon uniformly at the global level. Anyway, it is 
a concept which is supposed to play a central role for the well-being of future generations, 
and policymakers are required to face this issue seriously. 
The most widely-accepted definition is that proposed in 1987 report Our Common 
Future (also known as Brundtland report) by the UN, according to which “sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key 
concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given; the idea of ‘limitations’ imposed by the state 
of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and 
future needs”. Besides of its lavish language, this sentence is crucial as it highlights how 
between economic growth (intended as the way to produce goods and services able to 
satisfy people’s need) and natural resources availability there exists a complex and fragile 
equilibrium. Consequently, ‘growth’ and ‘development’ should be intended as different 
concepts (and not used as synonyms, as it often occurs with mass-media): while the 
former is a quantitative concept referring to the increase in the physical dimensions of the 
economy (and of its relative waste stream), the latter is a qualitative evolution, a change 
towards an improved (and not larger) system or structure.  
Outstanding contributions in this field have been those by development economist 
such as A. Sen (whose ‘capability approach’ does not view physical products as the final 
goods, rather as tools to develop the capabilities that allow one person to follow his 
                                                          
2 Renowned experts have criticized the final text produced in Paris since it includes only promises rather 
than a binding treaty, while its clauses may be modified each five years. 
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favorite path of life) and S. Latouche (father of the ‘degrowth’ theory, advocating, 
perhaps too idealistically, a reduction in our consumption patterns).  
But overtime several other scholars had already debated similar points; indeed, 
the idea that we should start looking after future generations’ world, and stopping 
behaving as harmful ‘cowboys’ had already emerged a few decades ago.  
During the 60’s, possibly inspired by the spatial mission of that time, K. Boulding 
coined the expression “spaceship Earth” to argue that, similarly to how astronauts have 
to carefully manage the limited reserves included in their carrier to survive, the same 
perspective may be used to describe how humanity should deal with Earth’s resources 
(Boulding, 1966).  
To point out how science and economics are intertwined in this regard, N. 
Georgescu-Rogen applied the laws of thermodynamics (arguing that at the end of every 
process, the quality of energy is always worse than at the beginning) to economics: he 
maintained that an economic process aimed at goods production lowers the future 
availability of resources and then the possibility of further production; then, economic 
modelling should include also this kind of considerations, instead of only focusing on 
market mechanisms and their failures. In other words, entropy law and its relative 
ecological constraints should be put at the basis of a ‘new economic thinking’ 
(Georgescu-Rogen, 1971).  
Following this mindset, one of his most distinguished students, H.E. Daly strongly 
maintained that economics students, not to neglect the implications of the laws of 
thermodynamics for global ecosystems, should be equipped with principles of biology, 
ethics and philosophy; otherwise, they would tend to concentrate their studies on finding 
perpetual growth models only. Quite ironically, Boulding, a few years before, had argued 
that “anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either 
a madman or an economist”3. Furthermore, according to Daly, with the economic growth 
of past century, mankind, that throughout history had lived in an ‘empty’ world (economy 
was small, and the number of manmade economics services lower than that of ecosystem 
services provided by nature), is now living in a ‘full’ world, in which new sustainable 
behaviors with regard to consumption, waste management, etc. are required. In other 
words, while for conventional economic vision, economy is the whole, and the ecosystem 
a part of it (being technology the only limit), for ecological economics the contrary is 
true. Then, since we already ‘filled’ the world with our activities, achieving a sort of 
‘steady state’ would be desirable: in it, development, intended as improvements in human 
living conditions, would be allowed to continue growing, while economic (and material) 
growth should be stopped (Farley and Daly, 2003).  
                                                          
3 Attributed to Boulding in: United States Congress House (1973). Energy reorganization act of 1973: 
Hearings, Ninety-third Congress, p. 248. 
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More recently, a very interesting theory is that of the so-called ‘planetary 
boundaries’, developed by J. Rockström. Taking advantage of his background in natural 
sciences, he has identified nine4 boundaries, the crossing of which would represent a 
tremendous threat for life on Earth. But even if just one of these gets worse, then all the 
others worsen too, causing damages to the biosphere. Two of them still need further 
computations, while, for those we have already reliable data, the situation appears already 
critical with regard to climate change, biodiversity loss and nitrogen cycle. The most 
astonishing evidence is the one concerning biodiversity loss. Its preindustrial value 
(representing the number of species becoming extinct each year) ranged between 0.1 and 
1; currently, it is estimated that Earth loses more than 100 species per year. It is true that 
precise data over total global biodiversity are still missing (just think of how many species 
could still be discovered in Borneo or Amazon forests), but such a speed up is impressive. 
As for nitrogen cycle, it is crucial for life, being it one of the fundamental nutrients 
involved in the production of food. Human activities are now converting “more nitrogen 
from the atmosphere into reactive forms than all of the planet’s natural terrestrial 
processes combined” (Rockström et al., 2009). Measured as the millions of tons per year 
of N2 removed from the atmosphere for human activities, in the pre-industrial epoch its 
value was 0, today 135. Nitrogen and phosphorus cycles are usually intertwined: data for 
both of them are highly alarming. This affects mainly life in seas and oceans, where huge 
increases in nitrogen and decreases in oxygen level are creating sort of ‘dead zones’. To 
conclude the analysis of Rockström’s theory, and to further extend our perspective, some 
words on climate change are necessary as well.  
From a certain point of view it is a tricky topic, since it is not straightforward to 
take into account numerous elements (e.g. the consumption of fossil fuels, the use of 
freshwater, extreme events like droughts and tsunamis, changes in temperatures, etc.) at 
the same time. Anyway, the large majority (97%) of climate experts agree that climate 
change and ecosystems degradation is mostly caused by human activities: they are not 
natural phenomena (Doran, 2009). It has also been created a network, The Consensus 
Project5, in order to spread evidences of human damages to the natural world. There is 
still who sides himself against this position, but all the main environmental indicators 
demonstrate that high degrees of environment depletion arose when humanity entered the 
industrial revolution. Unfortunately, civil society is not well-informed on this debate, and 
several common places seem hard to get destroyed: indeed, if data are cherry-picked it is 
easy to induce wrong beliefs in uneducated people. However, a detailed report indicates 
that all the main scientific research centers agree that the alarming increase in global 
temperature started approximately at the half of past century, when heavy 
industrialization both in Western and Eastern blocks, alongside the first steps of 
                                                          
4 These are: climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, chemical pollution, atmospheric aerosol 
loading, change in land use, stratospheric ozone depletion, freshwater consumption, effects on nitrogen and 
phosphorus cycles. 
5 http://theconsensusproject.com (last retrieved 21/01/2016). 
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development of former European colonies, occurred (EEA, 2012). Extremely similar 
results are obtained in the graphs relative to sea level and CO2 emissions: this cannot be 
a simple coincidence (Stern, 2007). Note that even the definition of ‘climate change’ itself 
needs a small digression. People often tend to confuse weather and meteorology with 
climate. Actually, the big difference between these concepts depends on the length of the 
phenomena under analysis. While the commonly-defined weather is made up of short-
term fluctuations in a limited area, climate is the results of long-term (at least 30 years) 
observations on a larger area and is given by statistically significant average values. 
Climate depends on several factors (geographical6, cosmic7, etc.) and is affected by the 
interactions of numerous spheres. Being a gradual process, it may potentially have 
tremendous effects. What is most worrisome is the fact that still we do not know clearly 
solutions to all these issues, or even if and how they exist. What instead is certain is that 
now climate change speed reached alarming values (EEA, 2012). And what is even more 
preoccupying is that poor people will be those who will suffer the most from climate 
change effects: for many of them, jobs (either formal or informal) and more in general 
livelihoods conditions rely strongly on natural cycles. If climate variability gets 
unpredictable, massive social conflicts will arise. Ensuring the accession to basic services 
like primary education and health, even in harsh conditions, will ensure that nobody shall 
be left behind, in the path towards sustainable development (Verner, 2011). With regards 
to social justice, it should be noted that vulnerable people are those facing massive threats 
even if their contributions to GHG emissions environment degradation is extremely 
smaller than that of developed nations. There seems to be thus a disjuncture between 
future risk and past and present responsibility: nonetheless, only in a few occasions 
international community dealt seriously with this point, trying to figure out some 
remedies for vulnerable communities (Bird, 2014). Consequently, the limited public 
budgets of developing countries are allocating large share of assets to pay considerable 
adaptations to a climatic scenario they are scantly responsible for (Althor et al., 2016). 
Indeed, an important term which has been coined is that of “Anthropocene”8, to 
indicate how heavily in modern times the natural history of the world is influenced by 
mankind, how humans are exploiting the resources at their disposals9. The weight of 
humans on Earth is now heavier than ever: various indicators, including population, paper 
consumption, water supplies, all present an exponential growth, starting more or less 
10.000 years ago, when human civilization exploded. Our system is not efficient: just 
think of the huge amount of food that gets wasted and how useful it could be in the fight 
against starvation in developing countries. So, as humans are able to change the structure 
                                                          
6 Altitude, latitude, distance from the sea, continental masses and mountains orientations, marine currents. 
7 Shape and movement of Earth, Moon gravity on water. 
8 This expression refers to the Ancient Greek word “ανθρωπος” (“human”) and the suffix “–cene” that 
characterizes all the epochs in which Cenozoic era is subdivided. 
9 Millenium Ecosytem Assessment, 2005: “Over the past fifty years, humans have changed ecosystems 
more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human history, largely to meet 
rapidly growing demands for food, fresh water, fiber and fuel.” 
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of the Earth with their activities, they also need to understand and be aware of this change: 
the health of ecosystems is dependent on economy’s physical size. 
As mentioned above, it is during the 70’s that all main indicators assumed 
alarming values: it is illustrated well by the comparison between the Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Kubiszewsky et al., 2013), the 
trends in Ecological Footprint (EF) and Biocapacity (BC) (UNEP, 2010), the study of the 
Living Planet Index (LPI) (WWF, 2014). These all indicate that a serious environmental 
degradation is currently underway10 (Appendix A). 
 
 
3. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
Recent economic studies have acknowledged that natural resources have an inner 
value, and so it makes sense speaking of a ‘natural capital’11. This is in line with an 
ongoing tendency in several areas of economics, i.e. the inclusion of ‘alternative types of 
capital’ in models aimed at explaining current global trends in a more precise way (e.g. 
just think of studies on intellectual capital, social capital and human capital).  Natural 
capital comprises the whole stock of natural resources on Earth, since it is responsible for 
providing goods and services in the long term (e.g. the flow of fish supplied by a river is 
potentially infinite). Hence, not only physical goods (timber, minerals, etc.), but also 
energy, biodiversity and, above all, ecosystems are included in this definition (e.g. a well-
managed river provides also erosion control and water catchment). Ecosystems are thus 
crucial since they include both biotic grouping and abiotic environment: whenever these 
two elements are mixed, they interact and provide a flow of services. To use standard 
economic theory’s terminology, ecosystems offer different kinds of benefits, to be 
classified in three categories: 
                                                          
10 GDP commonly measures economic growth: it estimates the market value of final goods and services 
produced in a country within a given period of time. Instead, the main goal of GPI is to better represent the 
actual economic welfare generated by economic growth: its computation assumes Personal Consumption 
Expenditures (GDP main component) as a starting point, but then it is adjusted using twenty four socio-
environmental indicators (e.g. pollution, income inequality, car accidents, volunteer work, noise pollution 
etc.). 
EF measures the amount of biologically productive sea and land areas required for meeting the rates of 
resource use within a certain geographical space by a certain population. BC can be viewed as a sort of 
‘environmental bank account’, as it is the actual amount available of biologically productive area. If EF 
gets larger than biocapacity, then there is an ‘overshoot’, an ecological deficit, meaning that we are 
consuming more resources than those naturally available. Using economic terminology, EF and biocapacity 
could be viewed as Demand and Supply of ES in the environmental markets. 
LPI’s rationale is that the number of animals currently alive can be viewed as a proxy of the quality of the 
environment. It measures more than 10,000 representative populations of mammals, birds, reptiles, 
amphibians and fish. 
11 Historically, this concept has been used for the first time by Schumacher in his 1973’s book Small is 
Beautiful, and has been later deepened by many ecological economists such as the already mentioned Daly. 
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i) goods (harvests, water, etc.); 
ii) services (recreation, tourism, erosion control, etc.); 
iii) cultural benefits (heritage, spiritual benefits, etc.). 
They may thus provide, regulate or support goods and services, also those with an 
inner cultural value. For example, with regard to watershed protection, protection from 
soil erosion, carbon sequestration and many others, economists started to use the terms 
‘ecosystem services’ (ES) (Daily, 1997) (Appendix B). This goes against traditional 
economics since it puts forward the idea that also non-human life is able to produce 
essential resources: ecological health is thus key. The idea that natural world is priceless 
is then mistaken. Rather, attributing an economic value to natural assets creates a common 
framework for private and public agents to work together. As some authors pointed out 
in last decades, manmade economic world is not independent nor autonomous; indeed, 
economies, created by societies, are sustained by ecosystems. Ecologists and economists 
should hence work side-by-side. But usually economic activities are conducted 
independently, without considering the ecosystem in which they are inserted nor other 
activities underway in the same area, thus neglecting long-term costs and possible future 
conflicts. On the contrary, an ecosystem-based approach may provide managers and 
policymakers with an integrated tool to plan and balance human activities respecting local 
natural equilibria (WWF, 2014). 
But, how can one concretely define such ecosystem services? Indeed, even if the 
idea behind the concept is quite intuitive, providing a formal definition may reduce future 
frictions and favour genuine cooperation. According to 2005 Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, ES are, broadly speaking, “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” 
(MEA, 2005). Further details on ES are provided by Daily (1997): “Ecosystem services 
are the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that 
make them up, sustain and fulfil human life. […] In addition to the production of goods, 
ecosystem services are the actual life-support functions, such as cleansing, recycling, and 
renewal, and they confer many intangible aesthetic and cultural benefits as well”. 
All human activities are possible because of ES presence, but at the same time we 
put pressure on the biodiversity that supports such systems. Since humanity is reliant on 
ES natural provision, it is important to know how humanity itself interacts with 
surrounding environment.  Note that ES are not always coming from commonly-intended 
natural realms; as a British study illustrates well, out of the eight broad habitats identified 
in its report, two (Urban and Enclosed Farmland areas) are intensively affected by human 
activities: nonetheless, they still provide several ES such as local climate regulation, 
cultural heritage, recreation and so on (Smith et al., 2013). 
Unfortunately, current situation today is critical, and depends on a general 
negative historical trend. After WW2, the emphasis that the Western economic model 
attributed to consumption and the maximisation of food, water and energy supplied 
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caused an alarming decline in habitat conditions: for instance, almost 30% of UK biomes 
are either severely degraded or reduced (UK NEA, 2011). At the global level, over two 
thirds of vital natural services are in decline (MEA, 2005). Indeed, a serious analysis of 
ES may not limit itself to discuss ecological issues: since humans live in and affect natural 
areas, social and environmental issues are to be discussed at the same time, highlighting 
possible trade-offs and opportunities. In fact, the degradation of a rural area usually brings 
a worsening in living conditions (UNEP, 2008). 
A parcel of land often may provide two or more ES at the same time: for example, 
forests preserve biodiversity, store carbon and defend from soil erosion. Being nature so 
interconnected and multiple benefits supplied altogether (cf. Rockström’s planetary 
boundaries), win-win solutions are difficult to find, and many trade-offs are involved 
(Wunder, 2005). 
Customary instruments used to price, to economically value an ES may be 
misleading, not allowing to carefully compute the value of the resources. Market prices 
indeed misrepresent the social value of an ES, being usually lower than it is; shadow 
prices instead help us in this task. 
Moreover, focusing on a single ES, albeit simpler than assessing multiple ES, may 
be misleading in policymaking. In any case, it is key the comparison between two or more 
options, where the less costly will be preferred. Policymakers should be careful not to 
‘restrict their horizons’, but to consider all the possible ES provided by a region. That is 
why recent scientific literature focused on valuing multiple ES at the same time (Barbier 
and Heal, 2006). The scientific rationale behind this is that isolating and valuing single 
ES is often difficult, given the many interactions between two or more ES. Therefore, 
valuing ES is not a simple task, rather it poses two important issues. The first point is that 
economists cannot be left alone in this assignment, but cooperation with biologists and 
ecologists is key. Secondly, also thanks to this interdisciplinary collaboration, economists 
should ‘think outside the box’, not considering a region as a totally isolated system, but 
as an integrated economic-ecological system.  
De Groot et al. (2012) argue that attributing monetary value to ES may help raising 
awareness as well as conveying the importance of biodiversity and ecosystems. 
Evaluating ES is extremely difficult, since once cannot ‘value the priceless’ nor place 
monetary value to something ‘of fundamental importance’: but ongoing world’s situation 
is critical. 
As a consequence, the ‘environmental policy toolkit’ now includes several tools, 
in order to promote environmental safeguards in different ways: 
 regulation and provision of services by government; 
 voluntary efforts by business, communities and individuals; 
 incentive or market-based mechanisms: 
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 charges (e.g. taxes and user fees); 
 tradable permits (e.g. carbon sequestration offsets); 
 certification schemes (e.g. eco-labels); 
 payments for ecosystem services (PES). 
Some of them attribute a leading role to the public sector, while several others rely 
on private agents’ initiatives. In particular, we shall focus on PES since they represent the 
most innovative topic in this research field. 
 
 
4. PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: DEFINITION AND 
MAIN FEATURES 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) represent perhaps the most relevant 
example of well-functioning markets for ES, being schemes that have already been 
largely adopted even in various developing tropical countries (those more threatened by 
climate change and environmental deterioration). These are innovative tools to translate 
external, non-marketed values of natural world into concrete financial incentives 
addressed to local actors (farmers, landowners, etc.) to provide ES (Engel et al., 2008). 
In spite of being a relatively young topic (first PES schemes have been implemented 15-
20 years ago), overtime they have gradually proliferated around the world. 
The most commonly-used definition of a PES scheme describes it as follows 
(Wunder, 2005). A PES is 
1. a voluntary transaction where 
2. a well-defined environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that 
service) 
3. is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer 
4. from a (minimum one) service provider 
5. if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality). 
This may sound as a long and complex definition, but following notes and 
examples shall clarify it. Critical aspects of this definition are that: 
 entrance into a PES agreement occurs on a voluntary basis, it is not 
compulsory. However, note that some government-financed schemes (e.g. 
China’s SLCP) seem to not respect properly this requirement. 
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 even if some projects may involve intermediaries (between ES buyers and 
sellers), generally payments are made directly from service beneficiaries 
to providers. For doing so, it is necessary a clear distinction between de 
iure and de facto agents. 
 additionality must be ensured: payments are made for actions over-and-
above those that service providers would commonly undertake. In other 
words, the provider must demonstrate that those practices would have not 
been put into practice without the PES program. 
 conditionality must be ensured: payments are actually made if and only if 
the delivery of ES benefits occurs. In other words, the provider must  
demonstrate how the practices he has implemented have actually 
contributed to safeguard environment; 
 interventions should not be easily reversible. The permanence in time of 
practices adopted should be ensured, even after the period of 
implementation of the program. 
 environmental leakages (i.e. the shifting of ‘bad practices’ to other areas 
as a consequence of the start of a PES project) must be avoided (Engel et 
al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008). 
The rationale behind PES is that who provides one or more ES (as any other 
services in ‘ordinary’ economy) should get paid for doing so (Smith et al., 2013). For 
instance, along the course of a river, a community living downstream, using the water of 
the river itself for drinking and farming purposes, may be willing to pay another upstream 
community for not polluting the same water. Or an international donor may be interested 
in paying a community in a forested area in a developing country to protect local species. 
Therefore, thanks to PES, previously un-priced ES (e.g. ‘water quality’) are now put a 
price on. Opportunity cost is a key concept here, since local actors, to maximize their 
profits, usually have to decide between two (or even more) possible land uses. For 
example, considering forest conservation, local landowners usually receive low benefits 
from it. More precisely, these benefits are lower than those they would get from 
alternative land uses (e.g. conversion to cropland and livestock). However, this 
deforestation (induced by the opportunistic behavior of ecosystem managers) may 
generate costs and/or damages to both local and global communities. Consequently, 
service users, paying ecosystem managers, may turn conservation into a more 
economically captivating option, convincing them to adopt it (Pagiola and Platais, 2007).  
Assuming a public economics perspective, PES try to realize what Coase’s 
theorem prescribed, i.e. through private negotiations what would otherwise be an 
externality gets instead internalized. Indeed, what we have provided before is a ‘Coasean’ 
definition, as it aims at explaining how PES work by means of the typical terminology 
used in public economics for (environmental) externalities. In Coase theorem the basic 
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idea is that, when the externality problem arises (i.e. when the actions of an economic 
agent affect the welfare of other individuals/communities), the ‘victims’ may reward 
(with money or in-kind transfers) the polluter in return for a reduction of his (polluting) 
economic activity12. It is then applied the ‘beneficiary pays principle’, while other 
traditional environmental policies (e.g. biodiversity offsetting13, Pigouvian taxes, etc.) 
follow the ‘polluter pays principle’. Regardless of the initial allocation of rights, 
according to Coase, then it exists a spontaneous tendency that enables the market to reach 
the optimal levels of production and pollution. In this way, the public sector (i.e. the 
government) would play a minimal role (smaller than that assumed with regard to other 
externalities-reducing policies, e.g. regulation and standardization). Indeed, instead of 
imposing strict regulations, standardizations or taxes, with PES it ‘only’ has to allocate 
rights and allow people to exchange them freely in the market (the main preconditions 
for the Coase theorem to work properly) (Coase, 1960). That is why Coase theorem is 
usually seen as a ‘market solution’ (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). 
According to these consideration, Wunder’s definition seems to promote a win-
win policy idea that is institutionally simple, direct and cost-effective, and as a 
consequence the dissemination of PES idea has been relatively quick and widespread. 
PES in fact result being very sustainable (not based on whims of donors, but on the self-
interest of service users and providers) and efficient (only what is worth conserving gets 
conserved) at the same time. For doing so, however, remember that these mechanisms 
must be tailored to specific local conditions, payments to providers based on payments 
by users and services actually delivered (Wunder, 2008). 
Anyway, recently the definition by Wunder has been questioned (Porras et al., 
2008). Indeed, it has been noted that PES usually are established in situations with high 
coordination and transaction costs among and within the different categories of agents, 
high uncertainty, asymmetric information between parties involved in negotiations and 
cognitive barriers for assessing the tradable services. Furthermore, since PES seem to rely 
heavily on market institutions only, the fact that just one ES (carbon) presents a well-
defined market is critical. Other critical points are the following: 
 with regard to watersheds and biodiversity, ES tend to result too complex 
to commodify and monitor overtime, especially across decades; 
 no referrals to poor ES providers are present, even if PES often take place 
in developing countries, with high poverty and income inequality rates; 
 the criterion of voluntary participation seem to be complied with only in 
relation to collective/club goods. 
                                                          
12 Note that, were the externality positive (i.e. producing benefits to other agents), individuals may find it 
convenient to subsidize that economic activity, to enlarge its scope. 
13 A scheme according to which damage in one place is compensated for by means of improvements 
elsewhere. 
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As a consequence, it has thus been noted that a PES scheme hardly succeeds in 
respecting the five requirements of Wunder’s definition altogether. Even those PES 
programs usually indicated as exemplary sometimes do not comply with all those criteria 
(e.g. Costa Rica’s national PES). 
Then, possible different definitions have been proposed, but what should be clear 
is that PES are to be intended as “transfers of resources between social actors, which aim 
to create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social 
interest in the management of natural resources” (Muradian et al., 2010). From this 
perspective, it appears clear how PES may turn out be powerful tools in the context of the 
widely-debated ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968): indeed PES may help 
generating a sound collaboration between all the actors (or at least the most important 
ones) involved in environment protection. 
In spite of their great potentialities, PES schemes must not be viewed as the 
unique, absolute solutions to environment degradation problems. Indeed, it may happen 
that, according to local conditions or agents’ features, other tools are better-designed to 
address some issues. For example, if ES provision is hindered due to the credit constraints 
of services providers, then it may be helpful providing them with access to credit; if local 
ecosystem managers do not have the authority to manage ecosystems properly, then 
clarifying property rights may produce positive results. This to recall that PES may be 
applied only to the case in which ES benefits are viewed as externalities by ecosystem 
managers, leading to a mismanagement of natural resources (UNEP, 2008).  
Similarly to what occurs with offsetting, also in this case geographical distance 
does not seem to represent a worrisome obstacle. Indeed, ES may bring positive effects 
to regions far from starting ecosystems (e.g. climate change mitigation improves global 
health): in such a case, PES present the advantage of linking two or more agents or 
communities, regardless of their geographical proximity. Moreover, PES may be 
developed at different spatial scales. Indeed there may be international, national, regional 
and local programs.  
Regardless of their location and scope, all of them usually include the following 
actors (note that the first two may be sufficient to implement a PES program): 
1. Buyers. They wish to secure the long-term provision of the ES they are dependent 
on. A necessary distinction to be made is that between the case in which buyers 
are the actual ES users and that in which buyers (in this case, usually governments 
and NGOs) operate as a third-party agent, on behalf of ES users. In the first case, 
we speak of ‘user-financed’ program, in the second of ‘government-financed’ 
program. User-financed programs proved to be more efficient, since the actors 
involved have first-hand information over the ES considered, are able to observe 
directly the proceedings of the programs and renegotiate the terms of the contract, 
if needed: this is why these programs are sometimes defined as ‘Coasian’, given 
the agents’ great possibility of continuously negotiating. In government-financed 
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programs, instead, buyers (i.e. public sector agents) have fewer information and 
chances to directly monitor the program, and sometimes result to be excessively 
driven by political pressures, rather than genuine environmental care; this affects 
negatively projects’ effectiveness, since project managers could aim almost 
exclusively at meeting the needs of certain target communities. In addition, 
government-financed programs are less able to adapt themselves to sudden 
changes in underlying conditions: as a consequence, several scholars now view 
them as a sort of ordinary subsidy programs (Wunder, 2008). 
2. Sellers. They are able to safeguard the delivery of ES. This category then may 
include a wide range of actors, as PES may be organized also in protected areas 
and public lands (being government and local authorities in this case sellers). 
Being economic agents, these actors are interested in studying whether possible 
buyers of the ES they provide exist or not, and their economic value. 
3. Intermediaries/brokers. Interested in environment safeguard, they basically help 
studying how to generate and sell ES. These may help reducing transaction costs, 
such as search and negotiation costs, favoring the relationships between buyers 
and sellers in general and designing scheme features. 
4. Knowledge providers. They may be specialists, local policymakers, scientists, 
researchers, legal advisors, professional consultants: all of them have the duty of 
providing PES participants with key information during the various stages of 
project implementation, in order to ensure that a feasible PES is put in place. 
PES schemes may thus present different features. For instance, there may be ‘one-
to-one’, ‘one-to-many’, ‘many-to-one’, ‘many-to-many’ programs, according to the 
number of buyers and sellers involved (intermediaries may be present in each of these 
configurations) (Smith et al., 2013). 
Given these heterogeneity of actors, future research may focus on the analysis of 
how different contracting powers among these may influence, either positively or 
negatively, the effectiveness of a PES scheme. Indeed, at times actors may have different 
(or even contrasting) interests, and the most powerful of them, via lobbying and bribery, 
may influence public policy critically (‘capture theory’), potentially putting at risk the 
well-being of other communities. This problem however does not seem to affect small-
scale user-financed programs, since these usually involve extremely intertwined 
communities (Fisher et al., 2008). 
In any case, it is crucial to conduct a serious cost-benefit analysis before than 
starting a PES program. Case-studies illustrate that start-up costs approximately are equal 
to payments for ten years; costs reflect local socio-economic conditions: in Los Negros 
project in South America these were worth $ 184/ha, in Vittel project in France $ 4800/ha 
(Wunder et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2013 b). Note that payments may be made in different 
ways (e.g. cash, technical assistance, in-kind transfers), according to the needs of 
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recipients (rural communities may prefer one or a combination of these, according to local 
traditions and cultural values). However, even if conditionality remains one of PES main 
elements, a distinction between ‘output-based’ payments (based on actual ES provided) 
and ‘input-based’ payments (based on the implementation of certain resource or land 
management techniques) may still be done. This latter category is more common, 
especially in user-financed schemes, since measuring the impact of a certain management 
technique on project implementation area may be a long and time-consuming process. 
Furthermore, when a PES scheme deals with multiple ES, these can be ‘packaged’ and 
sold in different ways:  
 ‘Bundling’, if one or more buyers pay for the whole package of ES arising 
from the same portion of land or body of water; 
 ‘Layering’, if diverse buyers pay for the separate ES arising from the same 
portion of land or body of water; 
 ‘Piggy-backing’, if not all ES generated are sold, but one (or more than 
one) ES is sold and the other services provided by the same portion of land 
or body of water are free of charge (possibility of free-riding for 
beneficiaries). 
Alongside these economic considerations, at the very beginning of research design 
unintended consequences need to be studied as well, in order to prevent possible problems 
in the future. They for example may deal with environmental leakages (i.e. whether a 
program in an area will pressure ES elsewhere or not), perverse incentives (e.g. if 
reforestation is rewarded, somebody may find convenient to cut down tree and replant 
them) and equity issues (i.e. whether payments will be equally distributed within local 
communities and ES providers or not).  
With regard to this last point, as we already mentioned, it is clear that PES 
schemes, involving rural communities either as users or providers of ES, may affect 
deeply their welfare. Nonetheless, PES must be primarily intended as instruments to 
improve the provision of ES. Indeed, even if PES projects take place mostly in low-
income countries, whether poor people shall be affected by them depends on specific 
conditions, such as which ES are sought (Engel et al., 2008). Moreover empirical studies 
on the ability of PES schemes to improve poors’ welfare produced contrasting results. In 
general great obstacles to poor inclusion are their lack of power (risking to be 
marginalized) and transaction costs (empirical studies in Latin America illustrate that 
higher transaction costs indeed represent greater obstacles than households’ own 
limitations) (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola & Platais, 2007). On the other side, also measuring 
the benefits of PES is complex, since they are computed as the difference between 
payments received and the cost borne to provide ES: since these estimates are really 
difficult to measure, discovering the actual scope of PES social benefits is not that easy 
(Barbier & Heal, 2006). Anyway, as far as poor enrolment in PES schemes is concerned, 
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in perfectly voluntary projects they are assumed to participate only if they would be 
better-off than without it, but this assumption cannot be made for those (imperfect) PES 
programs the participation to which is not explicitly voluntary. Sometimes participation 
may be hindered also by the difficulty to demonstrate the legal title or control over certain 
parcels of land, and by the fact that usually buyers, to reduce transaction costs, prefer 
negotiating only with few big landholders rather than with many small ones.  
Anyway, while the effects of PES contracts on ES sellers are generally positive (a 
stable flow of money, increases in land tenure, social capital and ‘site propaganda’), the 
same cannot be said for the effects on non-sellers: since these include several categories 
of agents (service users, on-site landless people, off-site actors in the value-added chain), 
different kind of problems (including free-riding and social conflicts) may emerge.  
Despite these considerations, additional objectives are often implicit in PES 
contracts, and these relevant (but still secondary) goals include usually regional 
development, employment creation and poverty alleviation (e.g. if poor farmers receive 
constant payments their disposable income is likely to increase). Remember in fact that 
for government-financed projects considering also social issues is a way to obtain 
political support to the program implementation: aware of this, local communities may 
however assume parasitic, rent-seeking behaviors, taking advantages of the situation. If 
it so happens, PES are not likely to bring benign effects, since the inclusion of several 
additional objectives may undermine the genuine development of a PES project and 
diminish available resources for pure environmental safeguard. Instead, user-financed 
programs are less subject to this kind of problem: in such schemes usually ES users and 
beneficiaries communities know each other, and the limited scale of the project does not 
allow to take too many objectives and considerations into accounting. As a matter of fact, 
‘targeting the poor’ results then being a feature of government-financed programs, while 
positive welfare effects have been achieved by user-financed programs even without 
including proper poor-targeting goals (e.g. PSAH project in Mexico). However, case 
studies analysis shows also that, even if PES may produce limited gains over and above 
opportunity costs for ES providers, this type of schemes may lead to different 
improvements, for example in terms of health (e.g. better water quality thanks to a better 
management of a watershed) and security of (property) rights (since PES schemes may 
only be implemented in parcels of land the legal authority upon which must be clearly 
identified) (FAO, 2013). In other words, if project managers focus their efforts more on 
poverty alleviation, then environmental activities may get deprived of important 
resources, and vice versa. Similarly, choosing between maximizing benefit per $ spent 
and caring of welfare impact may limit PES effectiveness, either in a sense or in the other. 
Addressing too many issues at one time shall then make it difficult achieving any sort of 
good results. 
It is interesting presenting the ‘ecosystem services curse’ issue too. In fact, despite 
their potential in environmental protection and poverty alleviation, PES may end up not 
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producing positive effects. Some precautions must be taken, preventing PES from 
damaging local development. Indeed, as resources-abundant nations may struggle to 
enjoy fully the benefits delivered by their resources, for example due to corruption, weak 
governance and connected inequalities (just think of the cases of Venezuela, Nigeria and 
oil), a similar occurrence may take place with PES as well, in ES-abundant regions. If 
with ‘ordinary’ resources problems are mostly due to poor legal systems, the well-
management of ES may be undermined by payments volatility, rent seeking and 
disparities in bargaining power. Strengthening transparency, regulations and institutions, 
monitoring regional policies, ensuring that only ‘real’ ES providers are being paid are just 
some of the tools governments and international organizations may use to counter 
possible drawbacks (Pagiola and Platais, 2007). 
In light of all these general considerations, how could one design a successful PES 
program? Some steps must be taken into account, in order to consider all relevant social, 
legal and technical aspects, to respect local traditional values, to be at the same 
economically convenient and to demonstrate additionality in environment safeguard. An 
accurate list of these steps may be like the following: 
1. identification of possible saleable ES, related sellers and buyers; 
2. identification of PES principles and solution of technical issues; 
3. negotiations and definition of agreements structure; 
4. PES implementation: monitoring and impact evaluation activities; 
5. analysis of further developments of PES scheme, including future 
inclusion of other ES (if possible). 
If at the beginning the focus shall be mostly on the study of whether ES exist in 
an area, prospects for their trade, and who are their buyers and sellers (some sort of 
questionnaires may be prepared to cover the main points), later project design shall 
include more specific aspects such as transaction costs, payments methods, duration of 
the contract, M & E, ‘packaging’ of ES, etc. (Smith et al., 2013).  Albeit time-consuming, 
it represents a fundamental process: only facing carefully each single issue parts involved 
shall be sure that no further problem (or at least, no extremely worrisome problem) shall 
arise during PES implementation. Nevertheless, ‘learning by doing’ is also in this case an 
important player, since unexpected occurrences are likely to happen in programs (such as 
those of PES) aimed at lasting a long period of time. Intermediaries and consultants may 
participate in one or more steps, but the essential roles shall be those of ES sellers and 
buyers: in particular, without mutual trust (sometimes powered by tools for mutual 
control) between them, success (i.e. environment safeguard) shall be hardly reached. 
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5. PES EXAMPLES AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To integrate previous general considerations, we find it interesting presenting now 
a few examples of the most successful PES programs around the world, to illustrate how 
they work in practice.  Albeit following PES take place in different continents, some 
common features may be highlighted: the design of a PES contract may require several 
years, all the clauses must be related to place-based conditions, targeting always plays a 
central role, and, as already mentioned, ‘learning by doing’ is necessary (since it is 
impossible to include in advance in the contracts all possible occurrences). 
 
5.1. VITTEL, FRANCE 
The Vittel case is considered to be a ‘perfect’ PES case study. It illustrates how 
private-sectors firms may participate in PES. This scheme takes place in Northeastern 
France, where the headquarters of Vittel (one of world’s major companies in the bottled 
water sector) are located. In 1992 the company was bought by Nestlé. Vittel’s water has 
always been associated with good health and wellbeing, thanks to its particular nutritional 
properties. French legislation for natural mineral water is severe, with many legally 
binding prescriptions. In the ’80s, from several studies it emerged that intensive maize 
cultivation increased the concentration of pesticides and nitrate in Vittel catchment, 
putting at risk water’s healthy brand. Five options were considered to solve the problem: 
out of these five, for both economic and environmental reasons, the best one involved the 
provision of incentives to local farmers for making them voluntarily change cropping 
practices. To better understand what concretely was going on, Vittel and INRA (France’s 
agronomic research institute) conducted a detailed survey (AGREV) in 1989. The main 
objectives included the analysis of the conditions under which farmers would be willing 
to change their practices and the financial support needed to realize it. Four main 
categories of farmers, according to the extension and productivity of their lands, were 
identified, as well as several techniques to reduce nitrates and pesticides in soil. Putting 
into practice possible solutions has been a long (10 years of negotiations) and complex 
process. A constant element has always been farmers’ involvement in the debate, being 
Vittel deeply interested in understanding their needs. Both parties showed interest in 
reaching an agreement. With regard to the monetary payment to farmers (around € 
200/ha/year), the compensation should have not to be lower than opportunity cost of 
changing techniques plus an extra (as an incentive), while Vittel also had its own 
opportunity cost. Many elements entered the debate, including possible changes to French 
law on inheritance (prescribing that every son and daughter receives an equal amount of 
land even if not interested in farming it), considerations on Vittel importance for local 
economy and employment (almost 2.000 workers out of 10.000 local inhabitants) and the 
monopoly power of large landholders (impossible to be substituted with others). Finally, 
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Vittel and farmers’ union agreed upon a wide package of incentives, which includes, 
among others, subsidies for the transition period between the use of previous (polluting) 
farming techniques and the adoption of the new ones, free provision by Vittel of organic 
compost to fertilize land and free techincal assistance by Vittel and the federation of local 
farmers. Each farmer discusses individually with Vittel other terms of the contract. With 
regard to conditionality, a specific type of contract has been created (“prêt à usage”), 
according to which not compliers with the terms of the contract would lose their land (it 
has never happened, however). Agrivair (an intermediary entity created specifically to 
facilitate the negotiations) has been later endowed with financial assets to buy the lands 
of retiring farmers and conceding them to young people wishing to establish a new 
agricultural firm, of course respecting Vittel’s prescriptions. Being Agrivair’s director a 
well-known entrepreneur has helped creating mutual trust between the two parts. By 2004 
all farms in the area had implemented the new cropping techniques (cattle-ranching and 
composted manure replaced maize cultivation and agrochemicals pesticides) and 
approximately 90% of water sub-basin was protected (and water quality maintained). The 
long-termism of contracts (18-30 years) has been key to convince farmers to accept 
Vittel’s proposals.  
Therefore, what makes this case so interesting? Basically, at the end everyone is 
happy, and better-off than starting conditions. The ES sold by farmers to Vittel is 
‘improved water quality’, necessary to guarantee Vittel’s productions (no packaging of 
ES is necessary, being there only one ES). Of course, being a wealthy company afforded 
Vittel to invest in scientific researches and providing incentives to farmers: such 
investments resulted fundamental to keep producing bottled-water and selling it 
worldwide. Farmers receive financial and technical support by Vittel and specialized 
agencies for converting their cultivation techniques into more sustainable ones. Vittel has 
behaved well also differentiating the contracts (e.g. according to farm location) and 
adapting the terms of the contracts to local situations. Also local community received 
indirect benefits, since the company employs many local workers. Additionality of this 
program is indeed difficult to compute, but it is unlikely that water basin without direct 
Vittel’s intervention would have bettered on its own. Also leakages (e.g. increased maize 
cultivations elsewhere) are difficult to be measured, while monitoring is ensured by 
Agrivair. Permanence is ensured as well, since farmers find new cultivation techniques 
economically convenient while payments for Vittel are necessary to safeguard local water 
basin. The case has involved numerous social, economic, legal and technical 
considerations, being all of them necessary to understand the ongoing situation and to 
stipulate successful contracts. Indeed primary reasons for success proved not necessarily 
being of financial nature. Rather, mutual trust, involvement of local workers and 
consultants and sustainability considerations have been at the center of the debate. Even 
if initially there have been imperfect knowledge, deep negotiations have helped reaching 
a positive conclusion. Important points include also establishing a strong and trustful 
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relationship with ES providers by means of active engagement (Perrot-Maître, 2006; 
Smith et al., 2013 b). 
 
5.2. Los Negros, Bolivia 
The Los Negros case is captivating since it is an example of how successful PES 
may include two ES simultaneously: ‘habitat protection’ and ‘watershed protection’. The 
former is financed by US Fish and Wildlife Service, interested in preserving migratory 
birds’ habitat; the latter by the farmers of Pampagrande municipality, interested in 
regulating water supplies for their crops. Indeed, in Bolivia water wastages and 
inefficiencies are serious problems: in Los Negros region, farmers estimate that during 
dry seasons the flows of water have almost halved in last two decades. Transfers are paid 
each year, provided that a specific committee monitors that conditionality condition has 
been complied with.  
Los Negros valley has a 26,900 ha extension with two main villages, Los Negros 
and Santa Rosa. On one side, the valley borders with Amboró National Park, for which 
illegal encroachments became recently a serious problem. Another issue is water 
management during dry seasons, a matter that raised several conflicts between local 
communities, since intensive agriculture is the main revenue-generating activity for 
farmers of that region (2-3 harvests per year). The wish to obtain larger areas available 
for cropping induced also deforestation, putting at risk local unique biodiversity (UNEP, 
2008). A local NGO in 2003 started designing a PES scheme aiming at preserving Los 
Negros watershed, given the relevance of the threats for the region and the relatively small 
number of people (1.328) to negotiate with. Both downstream and upstream communities 
were interested in PES. An external donor, US Fish and Wildlife Service was included in 
the consultations with local stakeholders, to demonstrate them how serious the program 
was (there were serious mutual trust shortages between the two rural communities). US 
agency agreed to pay for conserving Los Negros forests, important habitats for rare bird 
species. However, at least initially, attention has been mostly given to regulation of water 
supplies, but payments provided by US agency resulted being crucial to cover PES start-
up costs ($ 46.000). At present, downstream payments for watershed protection are 
administered by Pampagrande municipality, while water users are not yet directly paying. 
On the other side, upstream landowners were invited to join the PES scheme on voluntary 
basis (i.e. choosing which parcel of land and for how long enrolling in the contract). As 
of late-2007, over 2.774 ha were being protected by almost 50 farmers; contracts’ duration 
ranged between 1 and 10 years. Payments are provided yearly, and to monitor actual 
conditionality of the project GPS tools are used too. Note that payments are not cash, but 
in-kind transfers. They were discussed several alternatives (including road 
improvements) but upstream farmers preferred receiving beehives: this would have 
helped them to not waste quickly the money received, creating instead something that 
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lasts. This induced further improvements in environment conservation, since new jobs as 
beekeepers were created and forests as habitat for bees gained larger importance. A few 
farmers preferred receiving fruit tree seedling and barbed wire instead of beehives as 
compensation (criticizing beehives’ inflexibility as economic assets). Decisive 
monitoring is ensured by specific project control teams, including members from all the 
communities and NGOs involved: costs for maps, GPS instruments, etc. are equally 
divided. The main task of these teams is controlling if land parcels have been actually 
conserved, noting any change or damage. Sanctions have been established gradually, 
basically when each problem or inefficiency emerged. With regard to additionality 
computations, avifaunal surveys and twelve signalers along Los Negros river and its 
tributaries are used to check the protection of natural habitats and watershed. In 2005 
some sort of spatial differentiation has been introduced, since some vegetation types were 
viewed as more protection-worthy than others. Being a PES focused on environmental 
and resource management issues, landless and poor inclusion was not among the main 
objectives of the program: indeed, these, being without land to protect, are excluded. 
Nonetheless, a few of them still benefited from the PES, being hired to work on honey 
processing or having bought beehives from participant landowners. To sum up, this PES 
has been developed with the purpose of providing local water users with incentives to 
manage their water resources sustainably. Due to the lack of detailed information and 
effective institutional mechanisms this was a viable solution to overcome the problem. 
Improving the income of the majority of upstream farmers, the program has been able to 
achieve positive results both in biodiversity and watershed protection (Asquith et al., 
2008). Interesting peculiarities of the program are: 
• the customization of payments modes, according to the needs of participants; 
• the fact that two services were included in a single PES scheme (it allowed the 
starting of the project, overcoming initial financial constraints; free-riding 
problems, due to some overlaps between the areas relevant for the two types of 
conservation, still have to be solved); 
• the practice of conducting intensive data collection activities before implementing 
a PES scheme in this case has not been complied with. Alternatively, learning-by-
doing as been a constant feature, justified by the willingness of analyzing what 
was actually going on only after that money had changed hands. 
 
5.3. PSA, Costa Rica 
Among all Central America nations, Costa Rica is an exception for its level of 
economic development and environmental safeguard: for example, an outstanding result 
has been reached last March, when government declared that the country energetic needs 
were being met by using renewable energies only. 
       WP 140 / 2016 
 
 
More Working Papers CEsA / CSG available at 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/index.php/menupublicacoes/working-papers  
25 
When it was designed, Costa Rica’s country-wide PES scheme (known as PSA, 
“Pagos por Servicios Ambientales”) represented a pioneering experience. Nowadays, 
after almost 20 years from its start, it is widely considered as one of the best example of 
PES of its kind, and other countries in the region (e.g. Mexico) have tried to imitate it. 
Established in 1997, this PES program based itself on Law 7.575 of previous year, which 
identified the main four ES delivered by forests: 
1. hydrological services; 
2. biodiversity conservation; 
3. mitigation of GHG emissions via carbon sequestration; 
4. ecotourism, scenic beauty and related activities. 
Bundling them has progressively helped to measure their environmental 
relevance. In addition, that very law also established the Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamento Forestal (FONAFIFO): it is a semi-independent agency appointed for 
managing PSA, composed of representatives of public and private sectors and whose 
budgetary decisions must be approved by the ministry of finance. PSA did not start from 
scratch: rather, environmental concerns had entered somehow national policies since the 
’70s, when incentives for timber plantations were provided. Following measures included 
certifications such as CAF (1986) and CPB (1995). Then, PSA had already a concrete 
basis, and early payments and schedules were taken from previous initiatives. However, 
the main changes induced by PSA included the fact that government budget was no longer 
appointed to sustain financially this scheme (being new taxes and payments from 
beneficiaries being introduced) and, above all, the very change of the general purpose of 
the program, from support to timber production to ES provision (note that pro-poor 
policies were not among primary objectives). Therefore, it would be wrong to state that 
PSA is a mere continuation of previous initiatives, since, especially in the last decade, 
several innovations have been put into practice. 
The main source of income is represented by a 3.5% fuel tax (generating around 
$ 3-4 million per year), while others include the sale of ES to beneficiary agents. Specific 
new regulations are however needed, since, for example, if charging water users for 
upstream watershed management services has been successful (around $ 0.5 million per 
year), the same cannot be said for carbon and biodiversity. 
Indeed, the importance of forests for hydrological services was recognized by Law 
7.575 itself. PSA wished that, at least partially, PES would have been financed with 
payments from hydroelectric power producers. Since precise legal prescriptions were 
absent, FONAFIFO has been able to negotiate directly with water users and conclude 
several agreements. Later, the use of ES certificates (certifying the payment for the 
conservation of a hectare of forest) contributed to raise sharply the number of agreements 
(and amounts paid): at present, such agreements cover the full cost of environmental 
safeguard plus the administrative costs borne by FONAFIFO.  
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Contracts for biodiversity conservation have been financed mostly by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) managed by UNFCCC (around $ 8 million over 5 years). 
Other sources of finance come from a silvo-pastoral GEF project and Conservation 
International (around $ 1.2 million over 5 years). Efforts have been made to generate 
revenues from local tourism sector, but without success. As a consequence, a large area 
(over 900.000 ha), which does not present either the potential for water or carbon 
financing, lies outside protected areas in spite of being defined crucial for biodiversity 
conservation. Partial solutions are coming from the public sector. 
With regard to carbon payments, since the very beginning of PSA, FONAFIFO 
developed Certified Tradable Offsets (certifying a net reduction in emission of 1 ton) and 
sold them. Norway’s government and a consortium of Norwegian entrepreneurs have 
been the firsts to buy a relevant number (200.000) of such CTOs. The fact, however, that 
such emission reductions were due to avoided deforestation, and not to reforestation or 
afforestation (as prescribed by Kyoto Protocol’s CDM), partially hindered the initial 
development of this sector. To overcome this issue, also in light of REDD+ program 
implementation, new types of contracts have been introduced, while further financing has 
come from the BioCarbon Fund of World Bank. Last but not least, also landscape 
payments were considered a key point, but agreements with rafting companies and hotels 
initially did not emerge, as in the case of biodiversity conservation. In spite of its great 
potential, this aspect is seriously hindered by problems of collective actions (Pagiola, 
2008). In absolute terms, PSA program interests at least 10% of nation’s forested area 
(more than proper protected areas): it involves approximately 1 million ha of forests, and 
helped increasing country’s forest cover (from 20 to 50% of total land area).  
However, most finances come from the fuel tax, as service users only partly pay 
for the ES they benefit from: PSA may thus be viewed as a ‘supply side’ PES scheme. A 
major cause for this is, now that PSA functioning is clear and well-described, the tendency 
of local people to free ride the payments borne by others. 
Nevertheless, a serious decline in deforestation rate has indeed been registered, 
monetary value to biodiversity and forests has been attributed and a deeper understanding 
of socio-economic features of ecosystems achieved. PSA effect on households has instead 
been limited ($ 64/ha/year), since PSA itself was primarily designed to promote forest 
conservation (and not poverty alleviation) and poor landowners found it difficult to 
understand the convenience and importance of enrolling in PSA (Wunder et al., 2008). 
This PES scheme hence has been successful in combining effectiveness, low 
implementation costs and balance equity: indeed, the mainstream strategies to reduce 
deforestation have been applied to national landscape and people. Recently priority has 
been given to areas at high-risk of getting deforested, rather than following the initial 
first-come first-served principle. Female-headed areas and indigenous communities have 
been included too, being each social group targeted by specific measures and contract 
       WP 140 / 2016 
 
 
More Working Papers CEsA / CSG available at 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/index.php/menupublicacoes/working-papers  
27 
clauses. Generating direct payments, new jobs and healthier ecosystems the benefits of 
these PES seem clear (Pagiola & Platais, 2007; Porras et al., 2013). 
To sum up, how have initial inefficiencies been tackled? 
1. The lack of targeting in early stages of the program has been overcome thanks 
to the creation of specific priority areas since 2003 and by the fact that funds 
of several service users have their own targeting (e.g. watersheds with service 
user contracts). 
2. The issue of undifferentiated payments country-wide has been solved by 
creating ad hoc adoptions of higher payments when needed, as in Río Segundo 
river basin. 
3. To overcome initial undifferentiated modalities country-wide, new systems 
have been gradually developed: for example, agroforestry better suited to 
small farmers (including payment per tree methods) and natural regeneration 
(as a cheaper option than plantations for carbon sequestration). 
4. Lastly, designing new improved impact monitoring systems and retrospective 
assessments has helped to solve the issue regarding the lack of information on 
PSA effectiveness. 
In light of all these points, it should however be clear that PSA is not the unique 
panacea to solve all environmental degradation problems in Costa Rica; nonetheless, it is 
an important ‘carrot’ to include in a wider policy mix. After 20 years, which are then the 
main lessons learned from PSA? 
• It is easier to introduce a new PES scheme if existing laws already regulate 
somehow ecosystems-related payments. 
• If relevant regulations already exist, it is much easier to implement a 
government-financed scheme than a user-financed one. 
• Payments for sustainable watershed management are easier to implement than 
those for carbon and biodiversity, for which serious issues regard 
measurement and beneficiaries’ identification. 
• Targeting and differentiated payments are crucial elements to solve problems 
connected with opportunity costs and differences in the level of ES provided. 
• Due to changes of different nature (e.g. in national and international 
legislations), PES schemes should be flexible and able to be adapted to 
changing circumstances (Engel et al., 2008). 
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5.4. Arbio, Peru 
Deforestation and excessive exploitation of natural resources are serious issues 
affecting many rainforest-rich developing countries (e.g. in Amazon, Congo basin, etc.) 
(FAO, 2015).  
Madre de Dios is the third largest and the least populated Peru’s region. It is on 
the South-East side of that Latin American country, in a strategic position at the border 
with Brazil and Bolivia. 
Considered as one of the most important green areas of the planet, it hosts huge 
intact rainforests, a unique biodiversity and is striving to be resilient to climate change. 
Anyway, recently the region has been experiencing an increase in habitat loss and forest 
degradation mainly due to logging, mining and infrastructure (FAO, 2010). Trees are cut 
to plant new (and more profitable) species (e.g. palm oil) or to obtain additional areas to 
crop and livestock; this is endangering those plants, such as Brazilian nut, that to flourish 
need a pristine environment. Mining has been triggered by the exceptional endowments 
of this land of gold and other precious ores such that nowadays abusive extraction 
represents the illegal activity with the highest turnover (even more than drug); mining is 
dangerous also for its ‘collateral’ effects, such as soil erosion, mercury pollution, river 
contamination, etc. With regard to infrastructure, the creation of new networks has made 
accessible areas that just a few years ago were in the depth of the forest (and so difficult 
to be exploited by humans): roads, channels and railways are increasingly getting used 
by inhabitants of the poorest regions to move towards other areas (Barber et al., 2014). 
Serious concern has been raised in particular by the recently-built (2011) Interoceanic 
Highway (IH): it represents one of the main actions implemented by the 
intergovernmental forum Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of 
South America (IIRSA)14, and aims at connecting Peruvian harbors on the Pacific with 
industrial clusters on Brazil’s Atlantic coast. As a matter of fact, the rationale behind its 
construction is of economic nature (Vitte, 2009). Given the emergence of Far East 
economies and the intensification of Brazil-China relations (with China becoming 
Brazil’s first trading partner in 2009), having a new road crossing the continent and 
reducing considerably the time for sending and receiving goods from Asia is key. Serious 
debates on the potential threats caused by IH to local biodiversity arose even before than 
its construction, and still continue today. In general, on the one hand, roads contribute to 
economic growth and lessen social tensions in high-density regions, easing internal 
migrations; on the other side, they contribute to the exploitation and loss of a rich natural 
patrimony, and harm indigenous people’s survival, invading their lands often violating 
                                                          
14 IIRSA, established in 2000, is an intergovernmental forum composed of all twelve South American 
nations, with the final purpose of promoting regional integration among them by means of development 
in infrastructure, energy, transport and telecommunication sectors. It is a multinational and 
multidisciplinary forum coordinating the investments of governments, financial institutions and private 
sector in the above-mentioned fields. 
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their rights. Therefore, in spite of their possible socio-economic benefits, such 
infrastructures tend to dramatically affect environment (Barrientos Felipa, 2012). In 
particular, with regard to IH, a major worry is that it was opened when Amazon had 
already lost significant shares of its original vegetation: the fact that an important part of 
its route crosses Madre de Dios department, one of the last largely environmentally-
endowed areas in the planet, inhabited by several indigenous tribes, is alarming15 
(Dourojeanni, 2006).  
It is in this multifaceted scenario that several environmentalist initiatives have 
emerged. Some of them involve important international donors, others are managed 
directly by local NGOs. Arbio, “Asociación para la Resiliencia del Bosque frente a la 
Inter-Oceánica” (Association for the resilience of the forest against IH), was born in 
2010, aiming primarily at lowering the potential negative effects of IH construction. 
Established in the forest near Puerto Maldonado (Madre de Dios capital), it now 
operates on a 1.631 ha concession and employs about twenty researchers and staff 
members, hosted in a modest base camp. In fact, according to Peruvian Forestry Law 
27.308, private agents may obtain concessions on wide national forest areas: in doing so, 
they are responsible for all that occurs in their areas (e.g. paying sanctions if third-party 
loggers damage it). Such concessions are attainable by demonstrating the required 
qualifications to manage the prescribed portions of land, and last usually 40 years, with 
the obligation of presenting each 5 years a detailed and updated management plan. Being 
concessions part of national patrimony, in theory they could not be deforested 
excessively; nonetheless, from the authorities’ viewpoint, it may result convenient to turn 
them into agricultural terrains, since production and related fees would increase (Giudice 
et al., 2012).  To fight against these bad practices (and connected forest destruction), 
Arbio’s mission includes the following objectives: 
1) sustainable development of the Amazon; 
2) coexistence of humans and forest; 
3) endorsement of locals. 
In particular, Arbio deals with ‘productive conservation’: it is not totally against 
IH (at 20 km from its base), acknowledging its importance for local transportation and 
international trade, but wishes to propose alternative economic, environmental and social 
development models. In other words, the specific objective of Arbio is to prevent its area 
from getting deforested or polluted, but they would like to succeed in this not via an 
absolute conservation, but by means of a productive model taking into account the ES 
                                                          
15   Indigenous communities (10,000 individuals) are important and various elements, since there are 19 
ethnic groups and 7 language families (high relative presences are reported in Manu province). They crop 
land with traditional low-impact methods. The recent increases in urban population and migration from 
bordering provinces, fostered by the development of IH and its supposed economic benefits, are serious 
concerns for indigenous tribes’ vulnerability. 
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provided locally and forest products attained in a sustainable way (Arbio, 2013). Indeed, 
researches over the possibility for establishing a PES scheme are currently underway 
(Recanati et al., 2015): the cases of two specific ES, ‘biodiversity conservation’ and 
‘ecotourism/recreational services’, are worth being discussed.  
With regard to the first, we already briefly explained how Madre de Dios flora and 
fauna are critically endangered. ES beneficiaries (i.e. possible buyers) may include local 
government, civil society agencies and international donors. This latter possibility may 
produce significant outcomes from the very initial phases, since it would guarantee those 
resources needed especially to cover start-up costs. Local actors usually, due to corruption 
and opposition to projects run by Western operators, are harder to get convinced. Arbio, 
to assess the value of the biodiversity included in its concession, may contact specialized 
consultancy agencies or use proper methodologies such as the Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Program (BBOP)16 developed by Forest Trends Association or the wildlife habitat 
quality measures used in the computation of the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)17. 
Payments for biodiversity conservation may be either monetary or in-kind transfers: 
however, given the location of Arbio base camp (in a wild area, difficult to be reached 
from a properly-so-called town) in-kind transfers consisting in tools and instruments, 
albeit useful, would be harder to be transported. Furthermore, additionality in this case is 
justified by the fact that without PES Arbio would not be able to protect more effectively 
its land, while conditionality checks (i.e. whether biodiversity gets actually protected) 
may take place, for example, by means of measurements in the increase (or decrease, if 
things go wrong) of a sample of selected representative species or by sightings by 
guardians and monitoring staff. Perverse incentives are avoided: since its origin, Arbio 
has been led by a genuine interest in preserving wildlife, therefore the idea that its staff 
starts to kill or transfer species just to demonstrate, at a later stage, that its work produces 
positive results appears completely wrongful.  
Ecotourism would represent for Arbio another way to conserve environment and 
getting paid for doing so at the same time. Madre de Dios, given the uniqueness of its 
landscape and species, may potentially attract environmentally-friendly tourists. With this 
regard, the main problems for Arbio seem currently to be of logistic nature. Firstly, the 
concession is in a quite remote area, far from any international airport (Puerto Maldonado 
airport has flights only with other Peruvian cities) and reachable only after a long trip by 
boat or off-road vehicles. Secondly, accommodation possibilities are (being the 
concession in deep forest) still limited. Nonetheless, some sorts of ‘eco-lodge’ are being 
built without using polluting materials18. However, Arbio is likely to receive benefits from 
this activity: indeed, ecotourism both fosters attention on forest conservation and 
generates revenues useful for the economic maintenance of the concession. The costs 
                                                          
16 http://bbop.forest-trends.org/pages/guidelines (last retrieved 03/11/15). 
17 www.iatp.org/files/Environmental_Benefits_IndexConservation_Reser.pdf  (last retrieved 03/11/15). 
18 A similar example: www.ecoamazonia.com/en/lodge.html (last retrieved 29/01/16). 
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borne by Arbio for making this possible shall not present extremely high figures: these 
only include the efforts to improve the accommodation facilities of base camp area, while 
the guided tours in the forest shall present minimal costs. It has all the potentialities to 
become a profitable activity (similar projects charge around $ 200/night per couple), as 
other examples in the region already demonstrate. To sum up, ES beneficiaries, in 
addition to the protected forest, would be environmentally-friendly visitors, who do not 
fear to be hosted in austere (at present Arbio premises are without electricity and internet) 
but functional accommodations. Additionality and conditionality would in this case be 
strictly related, since Arbio shall be able to attract tourists (i.e. to get paid for 
conservation) if and only if the area they propose to visit is actually integer and well-
managed; the prevention of leakages shall be crucial, to not draw the attention of potential 
visitors by shifting possible detrimental activities in other areas. In any case, to foster a 
sound development of this activity, a wider and deeper collaboration with tourism 
agencies is advisable, especially for international tourists. Another crucial issue regards 
the relationship with indigenous tribes. Visiting their villages, without the pretension of 
modifying their lifestyles nor exploiting their land, could be a plus for a ‘real’ natural trip 
in world’s largest rainforest. This idea has already been put into practice by agencies such 
as Rainforest Expeditions since 1996. It has been possible also because some local 
communities wish to attract visitors as a way to defend their lands from the new 
infrastructures built in the region. For example, Rainforest Expeditions itself now hosts 
tourists in lodges managed by local people (which in return for their hospitality receive 
60% of profits), but relationships with them are not always straightforward, since local 
dwellers usually tend to appreciate time and serenity more than money. Despite such 
differences in mindset, this sort of ecotourism initiatives shows how revenues may be 
generated while benefiting at the same time both environment and indigenous tribes. And 
since also in proximity of its concession some communities live, Arbio should try to take 
advantage of it. 
At present, other potential ES do not seem to be eligible for a PES program 
managed by Arbio. For example, taking into account ‘watershed protection’, it would be 
difficult to demonstrate that operations carried out by Arbio, which borders a river only 
along one external side of its concession, actively contribute to protect local water basin. 
Consequently, when discussing the implementation of a PES scheme in Arbio 
concession the following considerations must be taken into account: 
• the concession (1.642,1 ha), in spite of representing a significant area, is even 
smaller than areas commonly hosting small-scale projects described in 
international guides and reports. This issue could potentially get solved with 
the acquisition of further land, so as to create a larger concession delivering 
an ‘appropriate amount’ of ES to be sold. However, interviewing Arbio staff 
on the main problems related to the enlargement of project areas, lack of funds 
and of (specialized and reliable) seem to be the main difficulties in doing so. 
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• the Peruvian concession system is, like, ‘written in stone’ and changes take 
place at an extremely slow rate. Indeed a new Forestry Law has been already 
approved a couple of years ago but it still has to be totally implemented. 
However, from the point of view of Arbio, the legislative situation is not very 
critical: after all, it has ensured so far a passable management of their area. 
• the only stakeholders existing around Arbio base camp is the native 
community, the relationship with which requires a completely different 
mindset to approach. There are not relevant rural or urban communities 
nearby, if we do not consider people working in the other concessions and 
agricultural lands, while in 6 years in the area Arbio staff has never seen 
somebody of the government other than sporadic medical expeditions (but no 
inspectors). Some sort of scientific collaboration with academic scholars and 
researchers is possible, whereas agreements with governmental institutions 
other than the local universities, albeit possible, are better to be avoided (due 
to corruption and rent-seeking). Anyway, Arbio has a number of partners 
which are not governmental nor rural: these are some local organizations that 
work to reach a similar aim, i.e. preserving wildlife against the deterioration 
taken by IH (e.g. Camino Verde, Asociación Agricultura Ecologica, ACCA, 
etc.). Generally, given the similarity of purposes, if necessary it is possible to 




The principal aim of this work was presenting all the main features of PES 
schemes and of their relevance for sustainable development, and discussing some key 
explanatory examples.  
Researchers studying the relationships between economic growth and 
environmental safeguard have already produced many reports and papers illustrating 
current critical situation. All the main indicators present alarming data (humanity is 
excessively taking advantage of the natural world): at present, we would need more than 
one planet Earth to sustain world’s current rates of consumption and environment 
degradation, with negative consequences for both flora and fauna. 
Thus it appears necessary investigating and implementing new tools to safeguard 
environment, so as to lower possible future negative breakdowns. Indeed, even if major 
events like COP conferences may pave the way for future international agreements on a 
large-scale, it is (perhaps, more) important also studying other possible solutions, 
especially those related with small-scale projects. Since these usually involve local 
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communities more deeply, they do not risk to be driven also by political pressures (i.e. 
mismanaged) as government-financed initiatives often are in developing countries.  
That is why research on PES and similar market-based instruments should be 
fostered in next years. PES are likely to result useful and to increase in number all around 
the world, given their peculiar features: in particular, what makes them so interesting is 
the fact that their contracts do not have to follow many long clauses set at international 
level (such as the strict guidelines of REDD+ initiative), but agents may directly negotiate 
with each other and agree on a contract on the basis of specific local conditions and 
values. The examples of successful projects provided throughout our paper show how 
PES schemes may possibly be established in very different contexts, without 
compromising their effectiveness and efficiency. This does not mean that agents or 
communities are totally free in designing their projects: in fact, some general criteria must 
be complied with in any case. Compensations must be paid only when the provision of 
one (or more than one) target ES is effectively guaranteed and ensured for a long period 
of time, and when such environment protection does not raise bad practices or exploitative 
actions elsewhere. After these conditions have been positively checked, payments may 
occur under different forms, but, in order to convince an ES supplier to enter the PES 
contract, they should always be higher than his opportunity costs related with other 
activities. This is necessary for all the parties being fine when the PES agreement is 
eventually put into practice: on the one hand, ES suppliers are compensated for their good 
management; on the other hand, ES beneficiary accept to pay for the safeguard of the 
natural resources they are interested in. 
Finally, PES contracts, albeit relevant and presenting high potentialities, are not 
to be seen as the universal panacea for resolving all environmental critical issues: rather, 
they are to be viewed as tools to be effectively combined with other public and private 
initiatives, in order to offer an integrated and complete buffer against exploitative actions. 
As hints for future researches, a deep analysis on the relationships between PES and other 
tools for environmental protection (and their combinations in different contexts) is worth 
being studied: in such a way, it should be possible to figure out where and when applying 
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APPENDIX A – SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
 
GPI vs GDP: 
 
Source: Kubiszewsky et al., 2013. 
 
Ecological Footprint vs Biocapacity: 
  
Source: UNEP, 2010. 
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF THE MAIN ES BY SERVICES PROVIDED 
 
1. Provisioning services 
• Food 
• Raw materials 
• Fresh water 
• Medicinal resources 
• Timber 
• Bioenergy 
2. Regulating services 
• Local climate and air quality 
• Carbon sequestration and storage 
• Moderation of extreme events 
• Waste-water treatment 
• Crop pollination 
• Biological control 
3. Habitat or supporting services 
• Habitats for species 
• Maintenance of genetic diversity 
• Soil formation 
• Photosynthesis 
• Nutrient cycling 
4. Cultural services 
• Tourism 
• Recreation and mental and physical health 
• Spiritual experience and sense of place 
• Aesthetic appreciation and inspiration for culture, art and design 
 
